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On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism

  • Cognitive Science
  • Published: January 1987
  • Volume 70, pages 79–96, (1987)
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On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism
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  • William Demopoulos1 
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  • 29 Citations

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Abstract

The following paper presents a characterization of three distinctions fundamental to computationalism, viz., the distinction between analog and digital machines, representation and nonrepresentation-using systems, and direct and indirect perceptual processes. Each distinction is shown to rest on nothing more than the methodological principles which justify the explanatory framework of the special sciences.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

    William Demopoulos

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  1. William Demopoulos
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Demopoulos, W. On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism. Synthese 70, 79–96 (1987). http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414027

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  • Issue Date: January 1987

  • DOI: http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414027

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Keywords

  • Perceptual Process
  • Special Science
  • Explanatory Framework
  • Methodological Principle
  • Fundamental Distinction
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